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Abstract
In this paper, I first outline the view developed in my recent book on the role
of idealization in scientific understanding. I discuss how this view leads to the
recognition of a number of kinds of variability among scientific representations,
including variability introduced by the many different aims of scientific projects.
I then argue that the role of idealization in securing understanding distances
understanding from truth, but that this understanding nonetheless gives rise to
scientific knowledge. This discussion will clarify how my view relates to three other
recent books on understanding by Henk de Regt, Catherine Elgin, and Kareem
Khalifa.
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1 Introduction
Scientific understanding is something of a topic du jour in philosophy of science. One
good reason for this is that the nature and status of scientific understanding had been
pretty well ignored until recently, for the most part treated merely as a tag-along to
scientific explanation. Explicitly considering the nature of our scientific understanding,
and how that understanding relates to the more thoroughly discussed topics of scientific
knowledge and scientific explanation, provides an opportunity to more fully explore how
scientific practices relate to the practitioners of science—the epistemic subjects in pursuit
of understanding. And so it is that considerations of scientific understanding naturally
give rise to discussion of idealization as well.
In this paper, I outline the view of idealization and understanding developed in
(Potochnik, 2017) and position this view in relation to Henk de Regt’s, Catherine Elgin’s,
and Kareem Khalifa’s recent books. In Section 1, I sketch my view of the role of idealization
in securing scientific understanding and a conception of understanding that supports this
role. In my view, idealizations regularly have direct epistemic value, even at the cost of
accuracy, insofar as they promote understanding. I highlight accordances between this
view and Elgin (2017) and de Regt (2017). In Section 2, I discuss what I take to be
a point of difference, or at least difference in emphasis, between my view and both of
those authors’ views. Put abstractly, I want to emphasize the significance of a number
of kinds of variability to this kind of position, including variability introduced by the
many different aims of scientific projects. Finally, in Section 3, I address what this view
suggests about the relationship scientific understanding bears to truth and knowledge.
In my view, scientific understanding is regularly furthered by some sacrifice of truth,
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but this non-factive view of understanding is nonetheless deeply related to the pursuit of
scientific knowledge. It’s just that most scientific knowledge is not strictly speaking of the
phenomena under investigation, but of causal patterns they embody. This discussion sets
up a contrast between my view and Khalifa (2017).
2 Idealization and Understanding
Idealizations are assumptions made without regard for whether they are true and often
with full knowledge they are false. Familiar examples include the assumption that a
population is infinite in size, the assumption that no other objects exert force on a
two-body system, and the assumption that some gas is ideal, that is, composed of non-
interacting point particles. I want to start this discussion by offering a general diagnosis
for the importance of idealization in science. I don’t think these ideas are particularly
controversial, but they will point the way toward what I see as the distinctive contribution
of idealization to securing understanding. This discussion relates closely to chapters 2 and
4 of (Potochnik, 2017).
Our world is complex. In particular, it’s causally complex: causal processes leading to
any given event can be traced indefinitely far back in time, and at any given point in time,
several causes influence any given event. (Here I include the causes often considered to be
background conditions.) Moreover, it’s not uncommon for causes to interact, that is, to
influence each other’s action, such as in feedback loops. And yet, faced with the need to
grapple with this complex world, scientists face cognitive, and other, limitations. These
limitations make it difficult to secure causal knowledge, to make accurate predictions,
and to pursue science’s other aims in this causally complex world of ours. Or, perhaps
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better, this point can be phrased positively: simple patterns are cognitive valuable. Simple
patterns support human influence on and understanding of our world. There is thus a basic
mismatch between the cognitive value of simple patterns and the world’s complexity. (See
especially Wimsatt, 2007.) So, in the face of this mismatch, we often resort to lying a little
bit: we artificially simplify the parts of accounts that we aren’t interested in to improve
our access in a variety of ways to the parts we are interested in. This is one service that
idealizations provide.
If it’s right that simple patterns are valuable for understanding and control, and
idealizations aid us in our pursuit of simple patterns, then idealizations have value. In
particular, because understanding is an epistemic achievement, idealizations thereby have
epistemic value. It’s worth clarifying the exact claim I intend to make here. Let’s
distinguish idealizations from idealized representations. By idealized representations,
I mean representations, such as scientific models, that incorporate idealizations. By
idealizations, recall, I mean false assumptions (or, more carefully, assumptions made
without regard for whether they are true). The assumption that some gas is composed
of non-interacting point particles is an idealization; the ideal gas law this assumption
facilitates is an idealized representation. Many philosophers have argued that idealized
representations have epistemic value. Indeed, this seems to be unquestionably true. What
I take to be more contested is the idea that idealizations themselves—false assumptions—
have direct epistemic value. I say ’direct’ because I do not take idealizations to be a first
step toward scientific understanding, to be improved upon later, but full participants in
the epistemic success of achieving scientific understanding.
So, in my view, idealizations can be used to facilitate representation of simple patterns
to generate scientific understanding. In particular, idealizations aid in the representation
4
of causal patterns. Causal patterns are, I think, a common focus in science. Causal
patterns are patterns insofar as they are regularities that are limited in scope and that
may permit exceptions. The ideal gas law characterizes the approximate behavior of most
gases, though its predicted relationships break down at low temperatures and at high
pressures. It also ignores molecular size and intermolecular forces. Recall the idealization
of an ideal gas composed of non-interacting point particles; this idealization achieves that
neglect. Accordingly, even within its scope of application, the ideal gas law has exceptions.
Causal patterns are causal at least in James Woodward’s (2003) manipulability sense: to
represent a causal pattern is to show how changes to a system would, over some range of
circumstances, precipitate changes in other feature(s) of the system. The ideal gas law
shows, for example, how temperature increasing in a sealed container of gas with a fixed
volume increases the pressure. Mastery of causal patterns is exactly the kind of thing
that beings who prize simplicity need in order to operate in and grapple with a causally
complex world like ours.
No phenomenon is determined by just one causal pattern. Rather, given causal
complexity, causal patterns abound. Any phenomenon embodies quite many causal
patterns; any of these patterns may be foregrounded in our investigation of the
phenomenon, depending on our interests. Here’s a very simple example: any phenomenon
that embodies the pattern characterized by the ideal gas law also embodies a version of
the van der Waals equation. But, that same phenomenon also embodies a host of other
patterns. An illustration will take a bit of additional imaginative work. Suppose the
temperature increase in a sealed container of fixed volume was in fact a can of aerosol
hairspray left in a car on a hot day. This phenomenon embodies the pattern described
in the ideal gas law. It also embodies the pattern of the greenhouse effect: the short
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wavelengths of visible light can enter through the glass of the closed windows, but the
longer wavelengths of infrared light radiated by the objects in the car that absorbed the
light cannot exit through the glass as easily. These patterns relate to different aspects of
the phenomenon, and which is of interest depends on which aspects we are focused on.
As these simple examples show, different patterns embodied by some phenomenon may
be closely related to one another or wholly unrelated (or anywhere in between).
Thus, idealizations can aid in the representation of causal patterns embodied by
phenomena, even as they introduce falsehoods of phenomena. This is the key to
idealizations’ contribution to understanding. In my view, scientific understanding of some
phenomenon requires (a) grasping a causal pattern (b) that is embodied in the phenomenon
and (c) focal to the cognizer(s). I’ll say something about each part of this requirement.
First, the emphasis on grasping I draw from Stephen Grimm, Michael Strevens, and others
who have analyzed scientific understanding (e.g. Grimm, 2012; Strevens, 2013). Grasping
a causal pattern in particular requires appreciating the nature of some causal dependence
along with the scope of that dependence, that is, the range of conditions under which
the dependence obtains. Causal patterns as central to understanding of phenomena fits
with dominant themes in the literature on scientific explanation, as the explanatory value
of causal information and of laws or patterns have each been emphasized (see Strevens,
2004).
Now, consider (b) and (c) in my above articulation of scientific understanding.
Understanding has a dual nature: it is both an epistemic achievement and a cognitive
state. Understanding thus must achieve both the proper relationship to the world, to the
object of understanding, and the proper relationship to the cognitive agent, to the subject
of understanding. (b) and (c) address these respectively. For grasping a causal pattern
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to yield understanding, the causal pattern must actually be embodied in the phenomenon
to be understood—the phenomenon must fit the pattern. And, that pattern must be
focal—it must relate in the right way to the subject’s cognitive needs.
If grasping a causal pattern can constitute understanding of a phenomenon, then in
the right circumstances, idealizations—false posits—can directly contribute to scientific
understanding and, thus, are of direct epistemic value. These ideas about idealizations
and understanding bear much in common with both de Regt’s and Elgin’s accounts of
understanding. For de Regt (2017), understanding is explanation based on intelligible
theory; it must be both empirically adequate and internally consistent. For Elgin (2017),
an understanding of a domain is a reflective endorsement of a network of interconnected
commitments in reflective equilibrium. Both also emphasize idealization and general
patterns, if not with the same term. The next section will explore an aspect of my view
that I believe distinguishes it from these authors’.
3 Variability and Many Aims
As mentioned in the previous section, Elgin also emphasizes the epistemic contribution of
idealizations, or a broader class of what she calls “felicitous falsehoods” (2004; 2017). As
she notes, if idealizations can directly contribute to scientific understanding, we need a
more relaxed requirement than truth for when a posit can be conducive to understanding.
She treats truth as a threshold requirement rather than as an absolute: any divergence
from the truth must be negligible, that is, safely neglected. And, she points out, whether
a posit is epistemically acceptable depends on its role in an argument, explanation, or
theory (or, one might say generically, in a representation). The ideal gas law assumes,
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contrary to fact, that a gas is composed of non-interacting point particles: this is true
enough. The ideal gas law represents a range of systems accurately with the aid of this
falsehood. But, if a theory of gases posited as a central tenet that gases are composed of
non-interacting point particles, this would not be true enough. It diverges from the truth
problematically, given that it is intended as an accurate claim.
I think Elgin’s insights here are important. Truth might function as a threshold re-
quirement, and where the threshold is for being true enough to contribute to understanding
reasonably depends on the role a posit plays, whether it is asserted, conjectured, assumed
contrary to fact, or etc. This is a necessary adjustment if idealizations are understanding-
conducive. But, in my view, this standard for epistemic acceptability is not sufficiently
variable to accommodate all the ways that idealizations facilitate understanding. The
epistemic acceptability of posits varies not just based on the role the posit plays in a
representation but also based on the specific epistemic purpose of that representation.
In the previous section, I suggested that grasping a causal pattern generates under-
standing of a phenomenon (embodying that pattern). Recall that phenomena embody
many patterns, and which can generate understanding depends on the focus of those
seeking explanation. So, that focus—the specific aim of understanding—also shapes when
a posit is epistemically acceptable. This gives rise to the following criterion for epistemic
acceptability:
A posit is epistemically acceptable when its divergence from truth is
insignificant, taking into account: (a) the posit’s role in the representation,
and (b) the epistemic purpose to which that representation is put.
Consideration (a) is Elgin’s insight, while (b) reflects an additional source of variability due
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to the specific aim of understanding. On this modified definition of epistemic acceptability,
different specific aims of understanding can motivate different kinds of idealizations, even
when the causal facts are all the same.
Here are two quick examples for how this criterion for epistemic acceptability works
and why the variability introduced by (b) matters. Bokulich (2009) discusses the closed
orbit account of electron absorption under magnetic force. This account employs the
idealization that electrons follow fixed orbits. This posit is not epistemically acceptable as
a claim of classical mechanics, taken as a theory. Indeed, scientists have refuted classical
mechanics as a theory of subatomic particles, including the claim that electrons follow
orbits. Nonetheless, this posit is epistemically acceptable as an idealization, an assumption
contrary to fact, in closed orbit theory. One difference is the posit is not a claim but an
idealization. A second difference is that the goal is to understand a specific, strange
phenomenon of electron behavior, and this idealization is apt given that aim. If the
aim were instead to explain electron movement within atoms, this idealization would be
unsuitable. These two differences amount to the epistemic acceptability of the posit of
fixed electron orbits varying based on both considerations (a) and (b) above.
The idealization of infinite population size is common in population biology. Unlike
electron orbits, this was initially introduced as an idealization; no biologist has ever claimed
that some populations actually are infinite in size. So any use of the infinite population
size posit satisfies condition (a) in the proposed criterion for epistemic acceptability;
acknowledged falsehoods can deviate dramatically from the truth without epistemic
harm. But, only some uses of this idealization are actually epistemically valuable. The
assumption of an infinite population is useful because it enables biologists to ignore the
role of genetic drift in bringing about some evolutionary outcome. Accordingly, this posit
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is epistemically acceptable as an idealization in an account of natural selection’s role in
bringing about some trait, since the aim is then to set aside any influence of drift. But it is
not epistemically acceptable, even as an idealization, if the aim is instead to represent the
role of drift. The posit of an infinite population directly interferes with achieving this aim.
If the aim is instead to represent all the important evolutionary influences on some trait,
then the epistemic acceptability of assuming an infinite population depends on the causal
facts. This idealization is epistemically acceptable if drift is not an important evolutionary
influence on the trait but not if drift is an important influence. All of this comfortably
fits within condition (b) of the criterion for epistemic acceptability I have suggested.
I thus believe that the threshold for what is true enough, for epistemic acceptability,
needs to be variable in more ways than Elgin’s (2017) account supports. I’ve suggested
that there is variability in the epistemic acceptability of posits depending on the posit’s
role in the representation and the representation’s specific aim. An acceptable idealization
(or other posit) for one specific aim may be unacceptable for a different aim. Elgin (2004)
says something like this as well:
There is no saying whether a given contention is true enough independently of
answering, or presupposing an answer to the question ‘True enough for what?’
So purposes contribute constraints as well. Whether a given sentence is true
enough depends on what ends its acceptance is supposed to serve.
But in her 2017 book, Elgin instead cashes out epistemic acceptability in terms of a
reflective equilibrium of commitments: “whether a representation. . . is acceptable turns
on whether it is an element of an account in reflective equilibrium” (89). I don’t think
this approach to epistemic acceptability succeeds in making sense of the epistemic value
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of idealizations that Elgin and I both emphasize. Idealizations employed by different
representations are regularly inconsistent with one another, in turn giving rise to idealized
representations that are, at least on the face of things, also inconsistent with one another.
Recognition of the variability introduced by different specific aims—including different
varieties of understanding pursued—is in my view a reason to jettison any expectation of
coherence among our scientific representations. Our representations, and the idealizations
that facilitate them, vary according to their specific epistemic aims. See (Potochnik, 2019)
for more on this concern about Elgin’s account.
This variability due to different aims is linked to other forms of variability as well.
First, in contrast to Strevens (2008) and Elgin (2017), I think even idealizations of
causal difference-makers can be epistemically acceptable. Because of our causally complex
world, many difference-makers for a phenomenon are incidental to a focal causal pattern.
Idealization provides a way to set those causes aside, saying just enough to set the stage
for the focal causal pattern to be grasped. Recall my example of the infinite population
size idealization just above. When the aim is to understand the role of natural selection
in bringing about a trait, it is usually advantageous to assume that the population is
infinite, which enables drift to be neglected and facilitates common mathematical models
of natural selection. This is so even when drift has influenced the actual outcome, so long
as drift hasn’t swamped natural selection’s causal role. The same is true, I think, for using
the ideal gas law to explain a gas’s pressure when that pressure deviates some, but not
too much, from what the ideal gas law predicts due to intermolecular forces.
Second, because grasping different causal patterns embodied in the same phenomenon
can constitute understanding, in my view, there are different explanations, different
varieties of understanding, even for a given phenomenon. Indeed, though discussion
11
of this idea is beyond the scope of the present paper, I believe this is so even for a
given explanandum (Potochnik, 2016). Different specific aims of understanding—put
more simply, different research questions—lead to a focus on different causal patterns
and thus occasion different treatments of the same phenomena. A kind of methodological
pluralism follows from this view. I don’t think science generates a unified understanding
or explanatory store but rather different, cross-cutting varieties of understanding, even of
a given phenomenon. This contrasts with Elgin’s emphasis on a community’s endorsement
of a network of interconnected commitments in reflective equilibrium. In my view, science
does not generate coherent accounts but piecemeal, interest-guided glimpses at some of
the causal patterns embodied in the complex phenomena surrounding us.
4 Truth and Knowledge
The view of scientific understanding I have outlined, where different varieties of under-
standing are occasioned by different specific aims and make liberal use of idealizations, may
seem problematically distant from truth and knowledge. Yet aren’t truth and knowledge
supposed to be at the heart of epistemic achievement and, if you think science is in the
business of epistemic achievement, at the heart of science? In this last section, I will
discuss how the aim of understanding relates to the aims of truth and knowledge on this
account. In the process, I will position this view in relation to Khalifa (2017), who accords
understanding a tighter connection to knowledge.
I want to begin by acknowledging that, even on my view, the unvarnished truth
sometimes best provides understanding. For example, to understand why some snakes
have vestigial leg bones, it can be enough for someone to point out the true fact that
12
snakes are descended from lizards. (In my view, this is a sufficient explanation for someone
who has the proper background information, including regarding evolutionary theory, but
lacks this phylogenetic information, presuming this is the kind of pattern they meant
to inquire about.) But in many other instances, the path to scientific understanding is
paved with falsehoods, that is, with idealizations. This is so whenever representing an
illuminating causal pattern is benefited by setting aside complicating details, details that
may be causally relevant in their own right, but that are incidental to the pattern focal to
immediate research. It is in this way that idealizations, falsehoods, can directly facilitate
understanding.
I thus suggest that understanding, not truth, is science’s ultimate epistemic aim. When
I say that understanding is science’s ultimate epistemic aim, what I mean is that when
the pursuit of truth and of understanding qua cognitive achievement part ways, the aim
of understanding trumps mere truth. This is so even when we restrict our attention in
the customary ways to relevant truths. Truth is in some cases the best way to achieve
understanding, and certain kinds of truth may facilitate the achievement of other scientific
aims, such as prediction. But science regularly achieves epistemic success not in spite of
but in part because of its deviations from the truth. This is the way that science navigates
the tension I identified at the outset of this paper between the cognitive value of simplicity
and the world’s complexity. Simple patterns are enlightening. If, because of our world’s
complexity, we need to get certain things wrong in order to grasp a simple pattern, so
much the worse for accuracy.
This is ultimately why idealizations play a positive epistemic role. On the view outlined
in this paper, an account that is less accurate of a phenomenon (i.e. more idealized) can
generate better understanding of that phenomenon when it depicts the causal pattern focal
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to those who seek understanding. It seems to follow that understanding is non-factive, as
Elgin (2004, 2017) claims. Explanations do not need to be strictly true of the phenomena
they explain. Someone can understand that A because B even if B is not entirely true,
and even if B is less accurate than some other accounts of A. (Though, recall, there is still
an epistemic requirement explanations must satisfy: they must depict a causal pattern
embodied by the phenomenon.) In contrast, knowledge is factive. To pick up our simple
example from above, one can understand that the pressure in a balloon doubled because
the volume was halved and PV = nRT , but one cannot know that PV = nRT in this
system (as it’s not strictly true). One can, however, know something closely related,
namely, that the pattern described by the ideal gas law is embodied by this system.
Khalifa (2017) may consider this view of understanding to be quasi-factive rather than
non-factive. This hinges on whether he requires non-factivists to reject (a) the approximate
truth of posits used to explain (i.e. the explanans) or (b) the approximate truth of the
explanatory relation (Khalifa’s q explains why p). Some passages are more naturally
interpreted in the former way (see p.156) and others in the latter way (see p.157). Notably,
for Khalifa, (b) does not require (a), but simply the truth of the explanandum p and that
the explanans q include some difference-makers for p (p.157). So, my insistence that some
posits used to explain are not true may not interfere with Khalifa’s quasi-factivism.
I am indifferent to where the requirements we adopt for factivity come down on this
matter. What I do think is important is to recognize how idealizations—falsehoods—
facilitate scientific understanding. I believe there is clear evidence that idealizations
are not merely tolerated in the vehicles of our scientific understanding but play central,
positive roles. If so, scientific understanding is at least sometimes achieved not in spite
of but (in part) because of a sacrifice of truth or accuracy. I don’t think Khalifa’s
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quasi-factive approach to understanding permits this, let alone emphasizing it. For
Khalifa, explanations more closely approximate the truth the more difference-makers
they cite. This makes it possible to order varieties of understanding relative to an
ideal, and it entails that more veridical representation of any difference-makers always
improves understanding. This precludes the possibility that a more idealized explanation
is epistemically better than a more veridical explanation (when the veridicality regards
difference-makers).
Yet, in my view, idealization can play an epistemically crucial role. Idealized
representation enables epistemic agents to grasp a causal pattern that a more accurate
representation of the phenomenon would obliterate. The ideal gas law, in part due to its
idealizations, applies across a range of systems that have different parameters in the van
der Waals equation of state. In doing so, it displays a pattern embodied across that broad
range of phenomena. When grasping this pattern meets an audience’s epistemic needs,
given their interests and background knowledge, this generates understanding—and the
van der Waals equation does not, or not so well. The ideal gas law also may be a step
on the way to the development of the more accurate van der Waals equation, but that
is incidental to much of its epistemic value, which consists in its value to understanding.
The ideal gas law is a standalone epistemic achievement, which recognition of other causal
patterns won’t replace and doesn’t directly supplement.
So where does this leave scientific knowledge? Knowledge is factive; that is, something
cannot be known without being true. This is in contrast to what I have suggested for
understanding, which I have argued can tolerate and even benefit from some departures
from the truth. It seems to follow that science may generate understanding without giving
rise to knowledge. But no. Rather, my account can quite naturally accommodate the
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widely held view that science’s epistemic success consists in knowledge. I have said that
scientific understanding of a phenomenon consists in grasping the causal pattern embodied
in that phenomenon that is focal to those seeking understanding. This is what justifies
idealized explanations sacrificing truth of phenomena. But these principled inaccuracies
of phenomena enable accurate representations of something else: causal patterns. Science
does generate knowledge, but it is knowledge of causal patterns.
Thus, in my view, the object of our scientific knowledge is not technically the
phenomena scientists investigate, but the causal patterns those phenomena embody.
Science generates understanding of phenomena, and it does so via knowledge of the causal
patterns they embody. Knowledge and understanding go hand in hand, but there is a
gap between their objects. The phenomena investigated in science spur our drive for
understanding, but because of the cognitive value of simple patterns, scientists regularly
choose to sacrifice some accuracy of those phenomena to the end of grasping the patterns
the phenomena embody.
The difference between truth of phenomena and of causal patterns is, I think, an
important one. I have suggested that patterns bear a many-one relationship to phenomena.
Or, the relationship is actually many-many, since different patterns embodied by any given
phenomenon group that phenomenon with different ranges of other phenomena. This
results in the variability I emphasized in the previous section. Different highly specific
aims of understanding lead to focus on different patterns, which in turn motivates different
idealizations, amounting to different sacrifices to accuracy of phenomena. All of this
variability, the rich ways in which sacrificing literal truth of phenomena improves our
understanding, and does so in part due to our specific interests, gets lost if we focus
simply on the limited respects in which we can still call our idealized representations true.
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At least some of science’s successes are epistemic successes and, in particular, generate
knowledge. But this knowledge is not strictly speaking of the phenomena under
investigation, but of some of the causal patterns they embody. Which causal patterns we
have scientific knowledge of depends on the specific interests of the practitioners, audiences,
and sponsors of science. And securing this knowledge involves idealizing features of
phenomena incidental to those specific interests—not as a first step to a later epistemic
achievement, but as one important aspect of a full epistemic achievement in its own right.
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